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194 ST. LOUIS LAW REVIEW
REVIEW OF RECENT DECISIONS
REMOVAL FROM STATE TO FEDERAL COURT ON DIVERSE CITI-
ZENSHIP-ACTION COMMENCED IN STATE COURT BY CITIZEN
OF ANOTHER STATE AGAINST NON-RESIDENT DEFENDANT
OF STATE OTHER THAN THAT OF PLAINTIFF-VENUE IN
REMOVAL-WAIVER-EX PARTE WISNER AND IN RE MOORE
OVERRULED BY LEE V. CHESAPEAKE & OHIO RAILWAY COM-
PANY.
Upon the question of removal of causes from State to Federal courts on the
ground of diverse citizenship where plaintiff and defendant are residents of dif-
ferent States and the action is originally brought in still a different State the cases
of Ex Parte Wisner, 203 U. S. 449, and In Re Moore, 209 U. S. 490, have been
controlling up to January 22, 1923, when a decision was handed down by the
Supreme Court of the United States in Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Co.
(U. S. Sup. Ct. Adv. Ops. Feb. 15, '23, p. 256), squarely overruling the above
mentioned cases.
In the case of Ex Parte Wisner, a citizen of the State of Michigan brought
an action against a citizen of the State of Louisiana in the Circuit Court of
St. Louis, Missouri. Defendant, a citizen of Louisiana, petitioned to remove the
cause from the State Court into the Circuit (now District) Court for the East-
ern Division of the Eastern District of Missouri, on the ground of diversity of
citizenship. An order of removal was thereupon entered by the State court, and
the transcript of record was filed in the Circuit Court of the United States.
Plaintiff, citizen of Michigan, filed a motion to remand the case to the State
court.
In that case it was held that under the provisions which are now embodied
in sec. 51 of the Judicial Code "an action commenced in a State court, by a citi-
zen of another State, against a non-resident defendant who is a citizen of a
State other than that of the plaintiff cannot be removed by the defendant into
the Circuit (now District) Court of the United States." It was also held that the
provision embodied in sec. 51 of the Judicial Code, respecting the venue of ac-
tions originally begun in the Circuit (now District) Courts, was strictly juris-
dictional, could not be overcome even by consent of both parties, and affected
removals accordingly.
The decision in Ex Parte Wisner seems to have been somewhat modified by
the later case of In re Moore. Moore, a citizen of Illinois, by his next friend,
brought an action against the Louisville and Nashville Railroad Company, a
citizen of Kentucky, in the Circuit Court at St. Louis, Missouri. Before an-
swer was due, however, the defendant, citizen of Kentucky, filed its applica-
tion for removal to the Circuit (now District) Court of the United States for
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,the Eastern Division -of the Eastern Judicial District o' Missouri, on the ground
-of diverse citizenship.
In this case, however, the plaintiff, after removal, instead of objecting
to the jurisdiction of the Federal Court, as did the plaintiff in Rx Parhe Wisner,
-iled an amended petition. It was held that he thereby consented to atcept the
jurisdiction of the United States Court.
From the two cases just considered it would seem that a citizen of a Stale
-who is sued in a State court, in a case involving diversity of dtizenship, in a
-district outside that of the residence of the parties, may and does consent to the
jurisdiction of the Federal court by filing his petition for removal; that the
-plaintiff may thereupon, if he desires, file 'his application to remand 'the cause-
and that if he does not do so, but appears in the Federal court without objecting
and submits himself to its jurisdiction the court may validly "proceed with the
'cause.
The law set forth above in Ex Parte Wisner and In re Moore, which had
been controlling, was overruled by the decision in the case of Lee v. Chesapeake
& Ohio Railway Company, on Jan. 22, 1923. In that case, plaintiff, a citizen of
Texas, brought an action against the Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company, a
corporate citizen of Virginia, in a State court in Bracken County, Kentucky.
'Upon petition by defendant the case was removed to the District Coart of the
United States for the Eastern District of Kentucky on the ground of diverse citi-
zenship. When the transcript reached the District court, the plaintiff moved
that the cause be remanded to the State court on the ground that the District
court was without jurisdiction, in that neither party was a resident of that
district. The motion was overruled, the plaintiff elected to stand on the motion,
and judgment was given for the defendant. The case was then taken to the
Supreme Court of the United States on a lirect writ of error to obtain a review
of the ruling on plaintiff's motion to remand. In the said Supreme Court the
judgment for defendant was affirmed.
Mr. Justice Van Devanter, who delivered the opinion of the court, first
points out that under sec. 24 of the Judicial Code, District courts have original
jurisdiction over two distinct classes of suits and that the diverse citizenship
and amount involved in the present case bring it within one of those classes and
therefore within the general jurisdiction of the District courts. In referring to
sec. 51 of the Code the Justice says (citing authorities), "this provision does not
limit the general jurisdiction of the District courts, or withdraw any suit there
from, but merely confers a personal privilege on the defendant, which he may
assert or may waive, at his election, and does waive, if when sued in some other
district he enters an appearance without claiming his privilege." Sec. 28 ot the
Code provides that "any other suit of a civil nature, at law or in equity, of
which the District courts of the United States are given jurisdiction by this-title,
and which are now pending or may hereafter be brought, in any State court, may
be removed into the District Court of the United States for the proper district
by the defendant or defendants therein, being non-residents of that State." The
question arises-what is meant by the words "for the proper district" in sec. 28?
They find exact definition in secs. 29 and 53 of the Code, and that definition
conforms to what has appeared in all removal statutes beginning with the orig-
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inal Judiciary Act of 1789. Sec. 29 deals, among other things, with the venue
on removals and shows that the removal must be into the District court "in the
district where such suit is pending." This requirement is emphasized by sec. 53
which provides that where the district is composed of two or more distinct divi-
sions the removal shall be into the District Court "in the division in which the
county is situated from which the removal is made." In the case of General In-
vest. Co. v. Lake Shore & M. S. R. Co., 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 106, it was reasoned
that sec. 51 did not withdraw any suit from those of which the District court
was given original jurisdiction by sec. 24 but that sec. 51 merely regulates the
place of suit, its purpose being to save defendants from inconveniences to which
they might be subjected if they could be compelled to answer in any district, or
wherever found. It affords defendants a privilege which they may, and not
infrequently do, waive. Mr. Justice Van Devanter, in referring to the removal
section, sec. 28, says that: "it applies to the jurisdiction conferred on the Dis-
trict courts in general, for it speaks of them in the plural. That it does not
refet to the venue provision in sec. 51 is apparent because that provision does
not except or take away any suit from the general jurisdiction conferred by
sec. 24 and because there could be no purpose in extending to removals the per-
sonal privilege accorded to defendants by sec. 51, since removals are sought
only by defendants, and lastly since the venue on removal is specially dealt with
by sec. 29. From the above reasoning it would seem that the plaintiff's assent is
not essential, in any sense, to the exercise of the right of removal, nor can he
urge that the removal be into the District Court for some other district, for it
is his act in bringing the suit in the State court within the particular district
which fixes the venue on removal. It was on application of the above views to
the case of Lee v. Chesapeake & Ohio Railway Company which caused the.Su-
preme Court of the United States to hold that said case was duly removed into
the District Court for the proper district, and that the motion to remand was
rightly denied-briefly, that the District Court had jurisdiction to proceed to a
determination of the cause.
* MEANING OF "PROMISSORY NOTE" IN REVENUE ACT OF 1918-
DOES STAMP TAX ON SUCH NOTES ALSO APPLY TO PUR-
CHASE AGREEMENT CONTRACTS ?-IT DOES NOT-IT APPLIES
ONLY TO SUCH COMMERCIAL PAPER AS SHOWS UPON ITS
FACE THE FORM OF A PROMISSORY NOTE.
In order to properly understand the dase of Haverty Furniture Co. v. The
United States (United States District Court, Northern District of Georgia, also
found in Corporation Trust Company 1923 War Tax Service, paragraph 4028),
it will be necessary to briefly summarize the facts as stated by Samuel H. Sib-
ley, J., in delivering the opinion of the court.
This was an action by the blaintiffl the Haverty Furniture Company, to
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